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ARTICLES

CONFRONTING THE "PROBLEM" OF
THIRD PARTY EXPENDITURES IN

UNITED KINGDOM ELECTION LAW
Andrew C. Geddis*
I. INTRODUCTION

The role that elections play in a liberal-democratic
polity is one that is too often assumed without being
closely examined. Elections are often considered to be
simply a way of finding out what the majority of the voters want, and apportioning public decision-making power
in accordance with that choice. As such, what is thought
to be important is that the outcome of the election process
be an unmediated reflection of the voting public's desires
and preferences. In order to ensure that the election process is accomplishing this end, the government ought to
refrain from interfering in the voting process, lest its actions result in a distortion of the free choice of those casting their votes. But this picture of the election process as
*
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representing a kind of "spontaneous order,"' to be kept
safe and secure from the meddling hand of the state, is
too simplistic. A prerequisite for the holding of any election is the existence of some framework of governmental
regulation to provide the various electoral contestants
with a set of "ground rules" to govern the competition between them. If such a set of ground rules did not exist,
issues such as who may run for election, how they may go
about competing for votes, and even the way in which the
victor will be decided would remain unresolved. Absent
some sort of clear and certain answer to these types of issues, the competition for public power will likely be less
an exercise in divining the majority's views, and more a
fulfillment of Hobbes' dicta on the state of nature.2 So, the
general point may be simply summed up as follows:
"There can be no election process in the absence of election rules, and there can be no election rules without governmental action."'
However, accepting the necessity of governmental
intervention in the democratic process tells us little about
the desirability of any particular rule that may be lain
down to regulate a particular nation's electoral system.
This is to say that it remains true that for a government
in a liberal-democratic polity to be able to claim legitimacy, that government must be able to source its claim in
the support of the majority of the voters, as expressed
through a competitively contested election process. Whilst
the government must be involved in creating a framework
of rules that enable this election process to exist in the
first place, if it were to use that rule-making role to somehow substantively affect the outcome of the vote, then the
very basis for the legitimacy of governmental authority
would be cast into doubt. Thus, the truly difficult issue
arises not when it is asked whether the government
should be involved in the election process, for it cannot
John 0. McGinnis, Against the Scribes: Campaign Finance Re1.
form Revisited, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 25, 31 (2000).
Hobbes famously describes life in the state of nature, when "men
2.
live without a common power to keep them all in awe," as being "solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short." THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEvIATHAN 66 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1651).
Samuel Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated Political Markets, 24
3.
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 93 (2000).
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help but be so involved. Rather, the trouble begins when
we consider the precise content or form that the governmental regulation of the electoral processes of a given society ought to take. What set of election ground rules are
the best, or most appropriate, ones for a nation to adopt to
regulate the competition amongst its political actors in a
way that ensures the winner at the ballot box can then
claim to govern with a presumption of legitimacy?
The establishment of controls on what is known as
"party funding" in the United Kingdom, or "campaign financing" in the United States, provides an instructive example of the problems associated with answering this
question. Money plays an important role in facilitating
the transfer of resources and the coordination of individual actions, and as a consequence some form of expenditure will inevitably accompany the undertaking of almost
any form of public political activity.4 Spending on matters
political is thus an unavoidable part and parcel of civic
engagement, which in turn is an indubitable good in a liberal-democratic polity. But money also has the potential
to detrimentally affect political decision-making, as when
those with the power to make such public decisions choose
to exchange the exercise of their decision-making authority for a cash payment - when politicians choose to accept
a bribe. An additional problem arises in the case of political systems that are founded on liberal-democratic principles, as this form of governance is premised upon the idea
that a certain degree of political equality should exist
amongst the participants in its public life.5 Yet, the distribution of wealth amongst the members of any given society will always be unequal, which may then translate into
inequality in the political power that each member possesses.6 So the close relationship between money and political influence has a Janus faced character, forcing any
4.

A truth that was understood even in the days of Aristotle. See

ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICs 186 (Carnes Lord trans. & ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1984) (350 B.C.).
5.

See JACK LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 27-29 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1975);

RONALD Dwo=KlN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1996).
6.
See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990); Daniel R.
Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 893, 900-01 (1998).
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liberal-democratic society to confront the extent to which
the desire to promote equality between participants in its
election processes should constrain the liberty of each
member to use his or her resources to promote political
views as he or she would otherwise choose.7
Trying to put in place a set of legal rules that
achieve a desirable equilibrium between these two values
of liberty and equality is, as a brief glance around the
world will attest, a task of almost Sisyphean proportions.8
In part, these difficulties have resulted from a general
failure to agree on what the proper sphere of influence for
money should be in the public political life of a society.9
The introduction of a particular set of legal rules designed
to bring about some specific outcome may also result in
unintended consequences, which may in turn create a
new set of problems for the political process. 10 So, given
the universality of the troubles experienced in drawing up
legal rules to regulate political spending, it is not surprising that the United Kingdom has also faced a variety of
difficulties in endeavoring to accomplish this task. Despite the fact that there have been legislative measures to
control the use of money in the U.K.'s electoral process in
place for well over a century, the ever-changing nature of
political competition has raised constant challenges to
these legal rules." Recently, the Parliament of the United
Kingdom has responded to these challenges by passing
the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
("PERA,). 12

7.

See K. D. EWING, MONEY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A STUDY OF
26-31 (1992).
8.
See, e.g., THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES: EUROPE AND
BEYOND (K.D. Ewing ed., 1999); COMPARATIVE POLITICAL FINANCE AMONG THE
DEMOCRACIES (Herbert E.Alexander & Rei Shiratori eds., 1994).
9.
See Andrew Geddis, The More Speech - More Competition Solution: CampaignFinanceReform After McCain-Feingold,19 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2001).
10. See Andrew Geddis, Hide Behind the Targets, In Frontof All the
People We Serve: New Zealand Election Law and the Problem of "Faceless"
Donations, 12 PUB.L. REV. 51, 63-64 (2001).
11. K. D. Ewing, The Funding of Political Partiesin Britain:Prospects for Reform, 7 GRIFFITH L. REV. 185, 186-88 (1998).
12. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41
(Eng.) [hereinafter PERA]. The full text of the legislation may be viewed on
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN CANADA
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This new legislation will have a major impact on
the ways in which political participants in the U.K. may
use money to attempt to influence the outcome of the electoral process. In light of these changes, this Article examines one particular aspect of the recent legislative move.
It focuses on how the new legislation regulates "third parties" that make expenditures on public messages designed
to sway the outcome of the ballot. The participants in the
United Kingdom's electoral process that fall under this
"third party" label come in a variety of shapes and sizes.
They range from a single individual with a liking for, or
grudge against, some particular local candidate; through
groups of like-minded individuals who are motivated by
some particular policy issue that they want addressed by
central government; up to trade associations, large companies or trade unions that have nationwide clout, and
are concerned with advancing the economic well-being of
their members. The outcome of some particular electoral
contest may be of great importance to such third parties,
giving them a strong interest in independently using their
resources to try and convince the voters to cast their ballot for or against one of the primary contestants in the
electoral race.
This Article further focuses on how the United
Kingdom has endeavoured to regulate such third party
spending on electoral matters, because this kind of electoral activity most perfectly encapsulates the dilemma
posed by the use of private wealth in a democratic political process."3 At one level, decisions about how to regulate
this type of spending have proven to be problematic because they involve fundamental questions relating to the
relationship between liberty and equality amongst participants in the electoral process, and to the role that
various electoral participants ought to be allowed to play
in competing for the voting public's attention. 14 So, one set
line at http'//www.legislation.hmso.gov.ukacts/acts2000/20000041.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2001).
13. See Andrew C. Geddis, Democratic Visions and Third Party Independent Expenditures:A Comparative View, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 5, 6

(2001).
14. Compare Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An
Economic, Political, and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 176365 (1999) (examining the implications of "a negative conception of liberty" for
the regulation of third party expenditures), with Richard Briffault, Issue Ad-
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of challenges arise when determining the extent to which
such rules should limit third party speech, as well as who
these rules should apply to, in a properly functioning, legitimate electoral process. But the issue of third party expenditures also brings into play a second-order question namely, who should have the final authority to determine
what limits are appropriate? In the U.K., this secondorder question of "who decides" brings the relationship
between the legislature and the judiciary into sharp focus.
Traditionally, the United Kingdom's political and legal
systems have hewn closely to the theory of "Parliamentary Sovereignty," according to which Parliament has
been regarded as having "the right to make or unmake
any law whatsoever, with no person or body having the
right to override or set aside enacted legislation."1 Because it consists of the directly elected representatives of
the voters, Parliament has long been seen as the institution with the strongest claim to represent the will of the
general public.16 But political spending is so closely connected to political speech that any attempt to control
campaign expenditures inevitably implicates individual
expressive rights. With the passage of the Human Rights
Act 1998 ("HRA"), 17 the courts in the United Kingdom
have been given a greater role in interpreting, and if necessary, defending such rights against legislative encroachment."8 What is more, as the elected representatives who passed PERA owe their very decision-making
position to the operation of the electoral process that they
are now seeking to regulate, there may be reasons to believe that they will craft rules that will best serve their
own interests. As such, the review of these measures by

vocacy: Redrawing the Elections/PoliticalLine, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1776-80
(1999) (arguing the need for stricter regulation of third party advertising so
as to "enhance the central purpose of elections: the aggregation of popular
preferences into a government.").
15. Nicholas Bamforth, ParliamentarySovereignty and the Human
Rights Act 1998, [1998] PUB. L. 572, 572.
16. See Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353 (K.B. 1611);
Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2, § 2 (Eng.).
17. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.) [hereinafter HRA].
18. See infra notes 119, 123-27, 129-31 and accompanying text.
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the courts may provide an external, "neutral" check on
such legislative self-interest. 9
In light of the above discussion, this Article attempts to do two things. First of all, it investigates how
the new controls on third party spending contained in
PERA came to be adopted, and explains the way in which
these rules act to regulate third party expenditures on the
U.K.'s electoral process. Secondly, it considers how the
development of the law in this area illuminates an unfolding relationship between the various branches of the British government when it comes to determining the ground
rules under which election competition occurs in that
country. The Article begins these twin tasks in Part II by
examining how the United Kingdom regulated third party
spending prior to the introduction of PERA, and by discussing some of the shortcomings of this historical system
of regulation. It then moves to illustrate the way in which
the content of the new legislation has been shaped by the
public's reaction to various recent scandals relating to political fundraising and spending. Part III then looks at the
influence of the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR"). Part IV addresses the deliberations of the Neill
Committee on Standards in Public Life ("Neill Committee" or "Committee"). In doing so, the Article traces the
variety of different factors that have impacted upon
Parliament's decision as to how third party spending
should be regulated by the new PERA. The restrictions
contained in this legislation are then briefly outlined.
In Part V the Article questions how this new legislative framework might be applied in the future, and the
role that the courts may take in this process of application. Here, it considers the impact of the introduction of
the HRA, and the new powers that this legislation gives
to the courts in deciding whether the spending restrictions on third parties act as an impermissible abridgment
of the right to free expression. It then more fully considers
how the new provisions in PERA might be applied to a
hypothetical example of third party spending, and the potential conflicts that these provisions may raise with the
HRA. It uses the hypothetical example to illustrate how
the response of the courts to the uncertainties in the regu19.

See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Mar-

kets: PartisanLockups of the DemocraticProcess, 50

STAN.

L. REV. 643 (1998).

110

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXVII:I

latory schema will be crucial in deciding the role that
third parties may play in the U.K.'s electoral processes.
As such, in Part VI the Article concludes that the recent
"domestication" of individual rights in the United Kingdom will result in a flow of decision-making authority
over the shape of that country's electoral process away
from the legislature and towards the courts.
II. THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF PARTY FUNDING IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, RECENT "SLEAZE SCANDALS" AND THE
IMPETUS FOR REFORM

In order to explain the genesis of the new restrictions contained in PERA, it is necessary to first give a
brief prdcis of the history of the regulation of party funding in the United Kingdom. ° Prior to the passage of the
new legislation, the regulation of party funding was
predicated on an assumption that dated back to the Victorian era, and which became increasingly obsolete as the
century progressed. 2' Because of an illusory notion
2 0 th
that the primary campaigner in any electoral contest was
the individual candidate rather than the political party
they represented, until the end of the 20th century the legal regulation of party funding continued to be aimed at
the local constituency rather than at the national level. 2
Thus, individual parliamentary candidates faced restrictions on what they could spend on seeking election. By
contrast, no limits were placed upon contributions to, or
spending by, the national political parties, nor was there
any requirement for political parties to disclose the source
20.

For a more complete account, see generally CORNELIUS O'LEARY,
1868-1911
(1962); MICHAEL PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, BRITISH POLITICAL FINANCE 1830-1980

THE ELIMINATION OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN BRITISH ELECTIONS

(1981); Ashley C. Wall, The Money of Politics:FinancingAmerican and British Elections, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 489, 501-08 (1997).
21. See David Butler, Elections: Legislation and Litigation, in THE
LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEOFFREY
MARSHALL 172, 175 (David Butler et al. eds., 1999).
22. See H. F. RAWLINGS, LAW AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 133

(1988); R.J. Johnston & C.J. Pattie, Great Britain: Twentieth Century Parties
Operating Under Nineteenth Century Regulation, in CAMPAIGN AND PARTY
FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 123, 129-30 (Arthur B.
Gunlicks ed., 1993).
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or the amount of their funding. That being said, in the
1950's legislation was put in place which severely restricted the use of the broadcast media for political purposes, which did have the effect of containing the spending of political parties and other electoral participants.23
Fundamental distinction was also drawn between
third party expenditures on local constituency campaigns
and those made on nationwide campaigns.24 Unless the
express permission of a candidate's agent was first obtained, third parties were barred from incurring any "expenses" greater than £5 if these were made "with a view
to promoting or procuring the election" of a particular
candidate.' The limit applied to all expenditures made at
any time, as long as they were intended to have the effect
of promoting the election of a particular candidate.26 Anyone who made such an unauthorised expenditure (or
aided, abetted or counseled the making of such) commit23. There is a complete ban in the U.K. on the use of television or
radio for the making of political advertisements, with the only exception being a limited grant of free broadcasting time provided to qualifying political
parties at election time. See Broadcasting Act, 1990, c. 42, § 8(2)(a) (Eng.).
The definition of a "political advertisement" is also very wide, covering "any
advertisement which is directed towards any political end." See also R. v.
Radio Authority, ex parte Bull and Another, 2 All E.R. 561 (C.A. 1996) (upholding a decision by the Radio Authority preventing Amnesty International
from running an advertisement relating to the genocide in Rwanda as it was
considered to be "directed towards [a] political end.").
24. See MARTIN LINTON, MONEY AND VOTES 7 (1994). See also KEITH
EWING, THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN BRITAIN 80-81 (1987); Lisa E.
Klein, On The Brink of Reform: Political Party FundingIn Britain, 31 CASE
W. RES. J. INT' L. 1, 18 (1999).
25. Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 75 (Eng.) [hereinafter RPA 1983]. The Act placed a ban on the incurring of unauthorised expenses over£Sby third parties:
[Wlith a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate.., on account (a) of holding public meetings or organising
any public display; or (b) of issuing advertisements, circulars or
publications; or (c) of otherwise presenting to the electors the
candidate or his views or the extent or nature of his backing or
disparaging another candidate.
Id.
26. The House of Lords held that all that is required to establish
the requisite intention is that "[the spenders] desire to promote or procure
the election of a candidate was one of the reasons which played a part in inducing him to incur the expense." Director of Public Prosecutions v. Luft,
1977 A.C. 962, 983 (H.L.).
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ted a "corrupt practice" punishable by up to one year in
jail.27 Where the spending was authorised by some candidate's agent, it had to be counted towards the total election expenses made by that candidate. Given that constituency candidates were themselves subject to a relatively low spending cap (around an average of £8,300 at
the 1997 general election), candidates' agents were not
well disposed to cut into this amount by authorising the
expenditures of third parties." Therefore, the £5 limit became, for all intents and purposes, the maximum spending allowed to a third party for the purposes
of "promoting
29
or procuring the election of a candidate."
In sharp contrast to the extremely restrictive approach taken to local constituency spending by third parties, the law placed almost no limits on the spending of
money by a third party at the national level.' ° In R. v.
Tronoh Mines, the High Court of Justice found that a nationally published newspaper advertisement condemning
the then Labour Government's policies, and urging the
election of "a new and strong government," did not breach
the statutory limit on unauthorised campaign expenses. 31
These spending limits were simply held inapplicable to
any third party expenditures made on "general political
propaganda, even though that general political propaganda does incidentally assist a particular candidate
among others."32 Following the decision in Tronoh Mines,
all restrictions on the amount that third parties could
spend on attacking or praising any particular political
party at a national level were swept away, leaving the
27.
RPA 1983 §§ 75(5), 168(1)(b).
28. See RAWLINGS, supra note 22, at 188-89 (outlining the difficulties faced by an independent group, Tactical Voting 87, in making its message known to the voters in the 1987 election).
29. Luft, 1977 A.C. 962. What is more, in Luft, the House of Lords
unanimously held that the distribution of pamphlets calling on people not to
vote for National Front candidates in certain named constituencies breached
the limit on unauthorised third-party expenditures, as the pamphlets were
held to have the effect of promoting the election of other candidates standing
in those electorates. Id.
30. But see supra note 23, describing the ban on using the broadcast media for political advertising.
31. R. v. Tronoh Mines, All E.R. 697 (Central Crim. Ct. 1952).32. Id. at 699-700. See also Grieve v. Douglas-Home, 1965 Sess.
Cas. 315 (Scot. Elec. Petitions).
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door open for the "extensive intervention [in the election
campaign] by outside elements with vested interests to
protect, whose only constraint is the size of their financial
resources, and who can engage in advertising both before
and during the campaign.
The regulatory framework for third party electoral
participants, as interpreted by the courts in the Luft and
Tronoh Mines cases, reflected the basic duality that until
recently characterised the whole of the United Kingdom's
approach to regulating political spending. Third party expenditures on supporting or opposing a particular issue or
political party at a national level were left almost completely unregulated. However, if an electoral message
specifically related to a particular, individual candidate or
electorate, then spending on it became so severely restricted as to be, for all intents and purposes, completely
banned.34 In the context of the British parliamentary system of government and first-past-the-post electoral system, in which the party affiliation of a particular candidate is of central importance to his or her chances of election, it seems hard to see the sense, let alone the justice,
in the distinction that was drawn by the law. 5 Given this
lacuna in the regulatory framework, it is not surprising
that a variety of problems began to emerge.
In particular, the lack of regulation of political
party financing at the national level, including the absence of any public disclosure of who was funding the
election campaigns of the parties, led to the claim that the
political process as a whole had become "tainted by a noncriminal corruption."5 During the 1990's, this "taint" was
reinforced by a series of scandals involving allegations
that tarnished money had been donated to the thengoverning Conservative Party, as well as to some individual Members of Parliament representing that party.37 In
33. RAWLINGS, supra note 22, at 135.
34. See supranotes 28-29 and accompanying text.
35. See RAWLINGS, supra note 22, at 188. See also G.W. Hogan, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland,and the United Kingdom: Three European
Approaches to Political Campaign Regulation, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 501, 526
(1992).36. PETER MADGWICK & DIANA WOODHOUSE, THE LAW AND POLITICS
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 211 (1995).
37. See generally SLEAZE: POLITICIANS, PRIVATE INTERESTS AND

PUBLIC REACTION (F.F. Ridley & Alan Doig eds., 1995).
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an effort to quell the public's outrage, the then Conservative Government appointed the Neill Committee to oversee the ethical conduct of the public's representatives. 3 "
This Committee was designed to remove the issue from
the realm of partisan political debate through placing it
under the purview of a specialised watchdog body, whose
membership was acceptable to all the political parties.3 9
However, this measure proved to be a case of "too little,
too late", and in 1997 the Labour Party came to power on
the back of a landslide general election win, attributable
at least in part to the public's continuing disquiet over the
various "sleaze" allegations leveled against the Conservatives.'0
To capitalise on the embarrassment that the issue
was causing to their political opponents, Labour had
made an explicit campaign pledge to introduce a greater
degree of transparency and accountability to the way in
which the political parties' election campaigns were
funded.4 In line with this promise, shortly after its election win, it expanded the terms of reference of the Neill
Committee to include the "review [of] issues in relation to
the funding of political parties, and to make recommendations as to any changes in present arrangements." 2 The
Labour Government also sought the Neill Committee's
advice on a specific set of questions relating to the desirability of measures such as banning political party funding from foreign sources, requiring the mandatory public
disclosure of political party funding and imposing spend38. See Klein, supra note 24, at 39-40.
39. See A Very British Sleazebuster, ECONOMIST, June 5, 1999, at 57
("What makes this body palatable is that it is so very British. It stands outside Parliament, but contains a member of each main party. It is independent, but has no teeth of its own.").
40. Peter Kelher, Why the Tories were Trounced, in BRITAIN VOTES
1997 108, 113-14 (Pippa Norris and Neil T. Gavin eds., 1997). See also David
M. Farrell et al., Sex, Money and Politics:Sleaze and the Conservative Party

in the 1997 Election, in 8

BRITISH ELECTIONS AND PARTIES REVIEW

80 (D. Den-

ver et al. eds, 1998).

41.

See

LABOUR PARTY, NEW LABOUR: BECAUSE BRITAIN DESERVES

(1997),
available at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/
lab97.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
42. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FIFTH REPORT, THE
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1998, Cm. 4057-I, at
BETTER

16 [hereinafter

NEILL REPORT].
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ing limits on election campaigns."3 The Government was
encouraged to give the Neill Committee such a wideranging brief due to the public disclosure of the fact that,
shortly before the 1997 election, the head of the British
Motor Racing Association had donated over £1 million to
the Labour Party's election campaign, and was subsequently granted a concession allowing the continued tobacco sponsorship of Formula One races.44 Expanding the
terms of keference of the Neill Committee's enquiry to
cover all aspects of the funding of political parties proved
to be an effective means of quieting the political fallout
from this revelation. Irrespective of whether such cynicism as to the Government's motives is warranted, the
Neill Committee took the opportunity offered to it with
both hands, producing a two-volume report containing
100 recommendations for legislative reform.45 In turn,
these recommendations largely form the basis for the
changes to the law governing spending on election campaigns brought in by PERA.46

III. THE EUROPEAN CouRT INTERVENES: THE BowMAN
DECISION

While the Neill Committee was embarking upon its
deliberations on the issue of party funding, the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") complicated matters by
issuing its decision in the case of Bowman v. United Kingdom. 47 The ECHR, which sits in Strasbourg, France,
adjudicates complaints brought under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("Convention") by claimants who allege
that their national government has acted in a way which
breaches one of ihe rights and freedoms guaranteed under
43. Id. at 15-17.
44. See Sarah Lyall, PoliticalDonations Taint Blair and His Image
of 'New Labor,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1997, at A7; Britain to Review Campaign
Donations; Prime Minister's Labor Party to Return a $1.7m Contribution,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 1997, at A33.
45. See NEILL REPORT, supra note 42.
46. The Neill Committee's report and the legislative response to it
are considered in greater depth, infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
47. 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (1998). See also Howard Davis, Bowman v.
United Kingdom - A Case for the Human Rights Act?, [1998] PuB. L. 592.
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that treaty.48 While the United Kingdom ratified the Convention in 1951, at the time the ECHR delivered its
judgment in Bowman, the rights and freedoms contained
therein still had not been incorporated as a formal part of
U.K. domestic law.49 Therefore, the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Convention did not have a defined
status in the United Kingdom's legal framework,"° and the
ECHR had no authoritative role in the British hierarchy
of courts. This failure of the U.K. to incorporate the Convention into its domestic law meant that the decisions
reached by the ECHR were not "binding" upon the Government, except in so far as it felt political pressure from
other European states, as well as its own citizens, to honour its pledge that it would be so bound."' As a matter of
practice, however, the U.K. has always accepted the
ECHR's decisions, and has consistently amended its domestic law if the ECHR found it to be in conflict with the
provisions of the Convention.52
In light of this fact of the U.K.'s habitual compliance with the ECHR's findings, Bowman was tantamount
to a process of judicial review as to whether Parliament's
decision to limit third party spending on constituency
races was an abridgement of any of the individual rights
or freedoms guaranteed under the Convention. The case
arose after Mrs. Phyllis Bowman, the executive director of
the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child
("SPUC"), was prosecuted for aiding in the distribution of
leaflets in various constituencies before the 1992 general
48. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention]. See also MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT
AND MATERIALS 65-70 (1995); FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10-11 (2d ed. 1996).
49. However, the Convention has since been incorporated into U.K.
domestic law through the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. See infra
notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
50. In re M. and H. (Minors), 3 W.L.R. 485, 498 (H.L. 1998).
51. See Convention, supra note 48, arts. 53, 213 ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to
which they are parties.").
52.
See Conor Gearty, The United Kingdom, in EUROPEAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY

53 (C.A. Gearty ed., 1997).
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election." The leaflets compared the record on abortion of
each candidate in the constituency, were not authorised
by any candidate's agent and clearly exceeded the £5
spending limit allowed for in the legislation.54 Following
her prosecution in British domestic courts, Mrs. Bowman
complained to the ECHR that the expenditure limit constituted a governmental action which was in breach of her
right to free expression under Article 10 of the Convention.55 The ECHR therefore had to answer the following
questions: Was the United Kingdom's £5 spending limit
on independent third party expenditures a restriction on
Mrs. Bowman's freedom of expression; if so, was there a
legitimate governmental aim that could serve to justify
such a restriction under the Convention; and if so, was

53. Bowman v. United Kingdom, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 180 (1998).
54. In total, 1.5 million leaflets were circulated, including 25,000 in
the constituency of Halifax (for which distribution Mrs. Bowman was prosecuted). The leaflet in part read "[wle are not telling you how to vote, but it is
essential for you to check on candidates' voting intentions on abortion and on
the use of the human embryo as a guinea pig." Id. at 181. It was argued that
this exhortation, combined with evaluations of each candidate's stance on the
abortion issue, was designed to promote those candidates with an antiabortion position. Whether the English courts would have found that this did
constitute an expense made "with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate at an election" is a moot point, as the charges were dismissed on the grounds they had not been brought within the one year time
frame stipulated in the legislation. RPA 1983 § 75(1). However, Mrs. Bowman
had previously been convicted in 1979 and 1982 for distributing similar leaflets at election time. Bowman, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 180-82.
55. Article 10 of the Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ....
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority or impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention, supra note 48, art. 10.
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the particular restriction at issue "necessary in a democratic society" under Article 10(2) of the Convention?56
The ECHR very, quickly found that, prima facie,
"the prohibition [on unauthorised spending] ...amounted
to a restriction on freedom of expression."57 However, it
then went on to state that placing a limit on the expenditures of third parties in the election process so as to foster
political equality amongst the electoral participants promoted a legitimate governmental purpose under Article
10(2), namely the "legitimate aim of protecting the rights
of others."58 In making this finding, the majority referred
to the free election principle enshrined in Article 3 of the
First Protocol to the Convention, 59 noting that: "[Iln certain circumstances the two rights may come into conflict
and it may be considered necessary, in the period preceding or during an election, to place restrictions, of a type
which would not usually be acceptable, on freedom of expression."6 °
The ECHR regarded fostering equality between the
electoral contestants and encouraging broad participation
by citizens in the campaign process as being legitimate
and worthy collective concerns that a government may
choose to address through restricting the ability of some
participants to engage in the electoral process. As such,
the issue for the ECHR finally came down to whether the
extent of the restriction on the freedom of expression of
56. Bowman, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 186. See also P. Mahoney, Principles of Judicial Review as Developed by the European Court of Human Rights:
Their Relevance in a National Context, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: WHAT
IT MEANS 134 (L. Betten ed., 1999); M. Fordham & T. de la Mare, Proportionality and the Margin of Appreciation, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS
PRINCIPLES 76 (J. Jowell & J. Cooper eds., 2000).
57. Bowman, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 186.
58. Id. at 187 (majority judgment); see also id. at 193 (joint concurring o. of JJ. Pettiti, Lopes Rocha, and Casadevall); id. at 194 (partly dissenting o. of J. Valticos); id. at 195 (joint partly dissenting o. of JJ. Loizou, Baka,
and Jambrek); id. at 199 (partly dissenting o. of J. Sir John Freeland joined
by J. Levits).
59. Id. at 188. Article 3 of the First Protocal reads: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." Convention, supra note
48, art. 3.
60. Bowman, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 188.-
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third parties adopted by the U.K. in pursuit of the legitimate aim of protecting the equality of the electiqn participants was "necessary in a democratic society."6'
By a fourteen to six majority, the ECHR found that
the legislative restriction on third party spending was
unnecessarily strict. The £5 limit went beyond what was
required to foster conditions of equal participation, and in
practice acted as "a total barrier to... publishing information with a view to influencing the voters." Even
though the spending cap served the legitimate end of
promoting political equality, it did so in a way that disproportionately interfered with the liberty of third parties
to participate in the discourse surrounding the electoral
moment.6 In making this finding of disproportionality,
the majority pointed to a legislative exemption that left
the British press free to support or oppose any particular
candidate, and the fact that national political parties and
their supporters were also free to spend as much as they
liked at a national or regional level.' But because of the
virtual ban on unauthorised third party spending, groups
such as the SPUC had no practical means of publicly
communicating their opinion about individual candidates
at a time when the voters' minds are most focused on
choosing their next set of representatives. 6' As a result,
the majority of the ECHR found that the extent of the
limit on third party spending constituted a disproportionate means of achieving a legitimate governmental aim,
and for this reason was an unjustifiable breach of the
61.
62.

Id. at 187.
Id. at 189-90. In addition, Judges Pettit, Lopes Rocha, and

Casadevall concurred in the majority decision whilst holding that the SPUC
leaflet was not intended to promote the election of any candidate but merely
to inform voters of the probable voting intentions of the candidates as regards
the abortion issue. See id. at 1.93.
63. See id. at 189-90.
64. Id. On its face this argument would seem to justify the virtual
ban on third party expenditures so long as all other actors in the electoral
process were subject to equally strict regulation. Perhaps what the Judges
meant was that as the British system of regulation leaves it open for these
actors to participate without any restrictions, it is unfair to single out third
party expenditures for a complete ban. This may be because there is no practical reason for such a ban (i.e., it performs no "loophole closing" function), or
because it inequitably and illegitimately discriminates between different
voices in the electoral process.
65. Id:at 189.
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guarantee of a right to freedom of expression contained in
Article 10.66
The Bowman decision has received some criticism,
both for the way in which the ECHR reasoned its way
through the issues involved,67 as well as for the particular
conclusion it reached. In particular, Professor Conor
Gearty has described the Bowman decision as being both
"depressing" and "ill-advised."68 Gearty's major critique is
that the majority decision in Bowman illegitimately substituted the opinion of the judges in Strasbourg as to what
constitutes an appropriate balance between the values of
liberty and equality in the British election process for an
"expression of will by the primary democratic body in the
[United Kingdom] .69 In so doing, the majority failed to
give a convincing answer to a crucial question: "[Is it any
job of the European Court of Human Rights to tell its
Member States what 'democracy' means or to override local judgments as to what in7°specific situations is in the
best interests of democracy?
After all, given the existence of reasonable disagreement over what constitutes an appropriate balance
between the values of liberty and equality in the election
processes of a liberal-representative democracy such as
the U.K., a directly elected Parliament sitting in London
would appear to be in a better position to set the ground
rules for national elections than is an unelected body of
judges, most of whom hail from a different national and
cultural background.7 1 What is more, the ECHR itself has
accepted that there are limits to the legitimacy of its
judgments in this area, through its recognition that each
Member State has a "margin of appreciation" in setting
66. Id. at 190.
67. See Magali Veneau, Restoring the Campaigner's Voice: Free
Elections and Freedom of Speech, 23(6) EURO. L. REV. 598 (1998).
68. Conor Gearty, Democracy and Human Rights in the European
Court of Human Rights: A CriticalAppraisal, 51 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 381, 394-95

(2000).
69.

Id. at 395.

70.

Id. at 390.

71. For arguments to this effect, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Legislation by Assembly, in JUDICIAL
POWER,

DEMOCRACY

AND

LEGAL POSITIVISM

251,

264-68

TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS

(2000);

MARK

154-76 (1999).
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the rules governing the conduct of its own elections. 2
Why, it may then be asked, did the decision taken by Parliament not fall within this "margin?" Given the ECHR's
failure to provide any sort of convincing response to these
challenges, Gearty concludes that it was wrong to tell
Parliament that its election laws placed a disproportionate restriction on third party expenditures. 3
The ECHR may certainly be critiqued for its failure
to give a response to the sort of objections that Gearty so
ably raises. But it may still be possible to go about constructing some sort of defence for the ECHR ruling in the
following way. We can begin by acknowledging that, after
all, the U.K. did take the positive step of ratifying the
Convention, thereby agreeing that the ECHR was to have
the power to review its governmental actions. In so doing,
it conferred upon that body some measure of authority to
define and protect the individual democratic rights of
British citizens.74 So, we may ask, what is the ECHR
meant to do when a citizen of the U.K. comes before it
with a complaint that the laws regulating that nation's
domestic elections breach his or her right to take part in
the democratic process? After all, the Convention's guarantee of a right to speak and participate must have some
normative content separate from, and independent of,
whatever a particular Member State happens to say that
it does at a particular time.75 This may be a more convoluted way of saying that while the ECHR may recognise
that each Member State has a "margin of appreciation" in
creating its own election rules, this cannot be the skme as
72. Bowman v. United Kingdom, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 188-89
(1998) (citing Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 23-24 (1987)). See generally P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EuROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 82-95 (3d ed.

1998).
73. See Gearty, supra note 68. In his dissent from Bowman, Judge
Valticos argued: "There is something slightly ridiculous in seeking to give the
British Government lessons in how to hold elections and run a democracy."
Bowman, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 194.
74. A recognition strengthened by the Government's recent moves
to "bring home the Constitution." See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying
text; Ian Leigh & Laurence Lustgarten, Making Rights Real: The Courts,
Remedies, and the Human Rights Act, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 509, 510-17 (1999).
75. See Alistair Mowbray, The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Promotionof Democracy, [1999] PUB. L. 703.
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a complete license to do as it likes.76 To take a real-world
example, if the "margin of appreciation" enjoyed by each
Member State left each State free to define the democratic
rights and liberties of its citizens in any way that it
chooses, then Turkey's decision to ban particular political
parties because their names and political platforms were
viewed as a threat to public security would not be a
breach of the Convention's guarantees." Nor, assumedly,
would a hypothetical decision by Turkey to outlaw advocating the repeal of its laws barring such political parties
be a breach of the Convention's guarantee of free expression - and so on right down the line.
Of course, it does not take us very far to simply
point out that for the rights and freedoms in the Convention to have any meaning at all, the ECHR must have
some power to decide if and when these guarantees have
been breached." In particular, such an insight is still
compatible with the argument that the ECHR should refrain from imposing its particular vision of democracy on
a Member State where that State has itself acted to regulate its election system following a vigorous, open, and
public debate on the form that its democratic processes
should take.79 It remains true that the people of a particular country are, by and large, in a much better position to
work out what democracy means for them than are a disparate panel of judges sitting in Strasbourg. But even if
we accept this claim, it still need not necessarily follow
that the ECHR overreached in its judgment in Bowman.
76. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
1, 23 (1976) ("Nevertheless, Article 10 § 2 does not give the Contracting
States an unlimited power of appreciation.").
77. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1 (1998); The Socialist Party v. Turkey, 75 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1223 (1998).
78. For similar arguments that the courts as institutions ought to
have the power to declare that a breach of basic individual rights has occurred, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Australian Capital
Television v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (High Court of Australia
finding that restrictions on the use of television to broadcast political advertisements were a breach of the right of free speech inherent in the Australia
Constitution); C.A. 6821193, Bank Hamizrachi v. Migdal, 49(4) P.D. 221 (Supreme Court of Israel holding that the rule of law required that it exercise
judicial review over legislative measures).
79. The author takes this to be the particular point made by Prof.
Gearty, supra note 68, at 394-95.
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We rather first need to explore whether the particular
provision overturned (the £5 limit on independent third
party expenses relating to some particular candidate)
really did result from such a vigorous, open and public
debate."' And if not, were there any other factors that
perhaps could justify the ECHR intervening with regards
to this particular regulation of the British electoral process?
As can be seen by the above canvassed history of
the limits on third party spending in relation to constituency candidates,8 the £5 spending cap hardly formed a
part of a clearly devised regulatory structure adopted after careful and deliberative public consideration. The legal controls on third party spending in U.K. elections developed (or, more precisely, failed to develop) in an ad hoc
manner, with the main legislative framework rendered
increasingly irrelevant as campaign practices changed."2
In addition, prior to Bowman, the rules on third party expenditures had already been substantially altered
through judicial interpretation - witness the consequences of the Luft and Tronogh Mines cases discussed
previously. 3 So, the actual regulatory framework was not
only the product of Parliament's decision making processes. Unelected judges in the U.K. also had a major hand
in its construction. It is of course arguable that Parliament could have rewritten the legislative rules if it did
not approve of the way that the courts had interpreted
them, but instead it had positively acted to reauthorise
the £5 limit as recently as 1985.8 However, the legislation
in which it did so would simply seem to have been little
80. In other words, there will always be a regression problem involved in this type of situation. The claim that the ECHR should not intervene to overturn a Member State's considered judgment as to how its electoral system should be regulated, where that judgment is the product of some
democratic process, still requires the ECHR to decide if the decision making
process of the Member State is appropriately "democratic" in the first place.
See Frank I. Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Ldws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 145, 162-65 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997).
81. See supranotes 24-33 and accompanying text.
82. Butler, supranote 21, at 175.
83. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
84. See Representation of the People Act, 1985, c. 15, § 14(3) (Eng.).
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more than a pro forma rubber stamp of a rule dating back
to 1949.85 Certainly there is nothing in Hansard to indicate that the measure was the focus of any real Parliamentary debate or attention at that time. Given all of
this, it may be questioned whether the rules governing
third party involvement in the U.K.'s election process
really were the product of the kind of vigorous, open and
public debate that should have caused the ECHR to refrain from reaching its own judgment on the issue.
What is more, it may be asked what realistic domestic political options were open to someone like Mrs.
Bowman if she were to try and have the limit amended. It
is true that she could utilize the U.K.'s domestic democratic processes to lobby Parliament, or to otherwise seek
to generate enough public support to effect a change in
the spending limits. But there are good reasons to doubt
that in this case the domestic political system would be at
all responsive to her concerns. Changing the limit would
require Members of Parliament to agree to expose themselves to more criticism of their candidacies and their persons at election time - a prospect that is unlikely to fill
them with delight. Evidence of the reluctance of Members
of Parliament to open themselves to such outside criticism
may be found in the fact that in the period since 1949,
they had voted to increase the base amount that they
themselves could spend on campaigning for election by
£4,515, whilst raising the spending limit for third parties
by just £4.50.86
In light of this factual matrix, the ECHR might
well have been justified in viewing the £5 limit as being
less the result of an openly reached, deliberative decision
on how the participation of third parties in the British
electoral process should be regulated, and more of a selfinterested legislative measure retained to protect individual candidates, including incumbent Members of Parliament, from external criticism come election time. This
would make the limit on third party spending precisely
the sort of participatory restraint designed to protect po85. See Representation of the People Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6,
c. 68, §§ 63, 64 (Eng.) [hereinafter RPA 1949].
86. Compare the spending limits on third parties and individual
candidates contained in the RPA 1949 with those contained in the RPA 1983.
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litical "insiders" at the expense of "outsiders" that the
ECHR should seek to eliminate if it is to properly carry
out its role of "policing the process of representation." In
such a circumstance, the ECHR may have been perfectly
correct to rule that:
[Wlhilst you [United Kingdom] may put some limit on
how much the various participants may spend on your
election process, your politicians may not insulate themselves from personal criticism by making that spending
limit so low that it completely excludes some interested
participants from being able to have any say at all.8

IV. THE NEILL COMMITTEE'S REPORT AND THE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE

Whatever the merits of the ECHR's decision in
Bowman, the practical effect of the judgment was to render the limits on third party constituency spending redundant at the very moment when the Neill Committee
was conducting its enquiry into the funding of political
parties. The Neill Committee therefore had to turn its attention to the impact of the Bowman judgment on Parliament's ability to limit political expenditures on the
electoral processes, especially with regard to third party
spending." A major problem for the Committee was that
the majority judgment of the ECHR remained silent as to
exactly what spending limit would suffice to overcome the
87. The locus classici for the argument that constitutional courts
should adopt this role in carrying out the review of legislative actions is to be
found in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW (1980). See also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 19. For a review of
the literature representing restrictions on campaign spending as a form of
"incumbency protection," see Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform:
Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1279
(1994).
88. The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a similar approach in
Libman v. Quebec [1997] 151 D.L.R. 385. See also ECHR's ruling in Incal v.
Turkey, 78 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1504, 1567-68 (1988) ('In a democratic system the
actions or omissions of the Government must be subject to the close scrutiny
not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion.").
89. For a general account of the Neill Committee's deliberations,
see Klein, supranote 24.
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"disproportionality" problem that made the previous limit
a breach of the Convention. ° Whilst £5 had been held to
be too low a spending cap, even given the ECHR's recognition of the legitimacy of protecting equality in the electoral process, there was no indication in the ECHR's decision as to what amount would constitute a permissible
expenditure limit. In addition, the question of whether
restrictions should be introduced on third party expenditures at a national level had to be considered, along with
the potential implications of the Bowman decision for this
issue, as "it would clearly be an exercise in futility for [the
Committee] to recommend a legislative innovation which
we anticipated would be set aside on the first legal challenge."'"
Therefore, the first issue for the Committee to consider was whether a new limit ought to be placed on third
party spending at a constituency level, and if so, what
level should that limit be set at. Although it recognised
that the previous limit of £5 was no longer tenable postBowman, the Committee concluded that the decision still
allowed for some spending restrictions to protect voters
"from being subjected to overwhelming election propaganda by a party which has greatly superior financial resources."92 To prevent this outcome, the Committee recommended that the amount that third parties should be
allowed to spend on "activities which are intended to
promote or prejudice the electoral prospects of 'particular
candidates in a particular constituency," be raised to a
figure of £500. 9 This amount, the Committee opined,
would prove enough to pay for the "production and distribution of a leaflet throughout a constituency or the publication of an advertisement in a local newspaper. " "
90. Mowbray, supranote 75, at 720.
91. NEILL REPORT, supranote 42, at 130.
92. Id. (citing Bowman v. United Kingdom, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175,
187-89 (1998)).
93. Id. This limit would exclude "lleaflets designed merely to bring
factual information to the attention of voters or to assist a national campaign
without referring to particular candidates." Id. The figure of £500 is contained in the Neill Report. Id.
94. Id. at 129. Whether the Committee is correct in this assertion is
questionable as they gave no evidence that the amount they recommend
would be in fact sufficient for these purposes. However, the Committee had
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Interestingly, at no point in its considerations did
the Neill Committee overtly question whether or not limiting the ability of third parties to make expenditures on
local constituency races was a desirable policy.95 The
Commitee seems to have simply assumed that this was
so, given its previously stated commitment to ensuring a
degree of "fairness" in the electoral process.96 Additionally,
as the Committee had also recommended that the existing
spending limits for constituency candidates be retained,
it felt that restrictions on third party spending needed to
be reintroduced so as to protect a candidate from having
to "devote part of his or her limited resources to rebutting
the attacks made by third parties.""8 In a similar manner,
once the Committee had concluded that a nationwide
limit on political party spending should be introduced (as
Bowman permitted),9 it bluntly asserted that some national limits on third party expenditures "are obviously
needed and obviously need to be enforced."1 °0 Without
such restrictions, the Committee claimed, the cap on naalready pointed out that a limit of £1,000 ran the risk of swamping the £8,300
spending cap on individual candidates. NEILL REPORT, supra note 42, at 129.
It had also considered and rejected as being "a very small sum of money" a
figure of £100 (the limit that the Government had imposed on third party expenditures relating to elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly). Id. Given
this, the £500 suggestion may have been a Solomonic compromise rather
than a limit based on a concrete assessment of the actual practical needs of
third parties.
95. In fact there was no real discussion at all about the limits on local campaign spending, as "they were supported by all the main political
parties and by all the individuals and organisations whose evidence bore on
the topic." Id. at 111.
96. "[Wlhile holding to the view that the creation of a level
playing field is an unattainable aspiration, we do consider that fairness
has a real place to play in the overhaul of the country's electoral and
constitutional arrangements." Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 111. But see id. at 112, arguing for an increase in the
spending limit for by-elections.
98. NEILL REPORT, supra note 42, at 129. However, the Committee
never expressly explains why protecting the spending limits on candidates
outweighs the speech rights of third parties. Such an explanation can only be
found by reference to the Neill Committee's overall desire to establish a
measure of equality between electoral participants.
99. Id. at 116-26, especially R47 (endorsing a national limit), R49
(suggesting a figure of £20 million) and R51 (arguing that the limits should
"be set in terms of the purposes for which the expenditure is incurred rather
than in terms of any specified time period.").
100. Id. at 131.
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tionwide spending by political parties could be evaded either by the parties themselves setting up "front organisations" to spend on their behalf, or by genuinely independent third parties engaging in "large-scale propaganda"
aimed at securing the election or defeat of a party.1 ' To
prevent these loopholes from eviscerating the rest of the
spending restrictions it had recommended, the Committee
reached the "straightforward" conclusion that "[a]ny individual or organisation that incurs election
expenses
10 2
should be subject to an expenditure limit.
Following the release of the Neill Committee's report, the Labour Government advanced a set of legislative
proposals designed to overhaul the rules governing spending on elections in line with the report's recommendations. Parliament in turn passed these proposals into law
via PERA. 10 3 The fact that the new legislation incorporated almost all of the Neill Committee's recommendations is a testament to the general respect with which the
Committee is viewed. Given its non-partisan composition,
the recommendations it made were somewhat immunised
from accusations of bias. And as the roots of the Neill
Committee's task lay in a general public desire for
change, its findings were endowed with a mantle of moral
legitimacy and urgency. In a similar fashion, the appointment of Royal Commissions in both Canada and New
Zealand to consider whether reforms were required to the
electoral laws in those countries proved to be an effective
way of overcoming the inevitable partisan conflicts raised
by the issue, and helped to secure a broad basis of support
for subsequent legislative moves amongst those countries'
political actors.0 4
101. Id. In raising these concerns the Committee pointed to the
"American experience" with campaign finance regulation, as well as to previous examples of third party interventions in British elections and to the concerns of the political parties. Id. at 131-32.
102. Id. at 132.
103. For an excellent overview of the content of the new legislation,
see Keith Ewing, Transparency, Accountability and Equality: The Political
Parties,Elections and Referendums Act 2000, [2001] PUB. L. 542.
104. See CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL REFORM AND
PARTY FINANCING, REFORMING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

(1991);

ROYAL

TOWARDS

COMMISSION

DEMOCRACY

(1986).

ON

THE

ELECTORAL

SYSTEM,

NEW ZEALAND
A

BETTER

20011

U.K ELECTIONLAW

129

Under the new regulatory schema instituted by
PERA, the national political parties as well as individual
candidates will henceforth be subject to restrictions on
both fundraising for, and spending on, their election campaigns.105 In line with the Neill Committee's recommendations, limits have also been placed on third party expenditures at both a national and a constituency level. No third
party will be permitted to make "controlled expenditures " "' in excess of £10,000 in England (or £5,000 in
Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland) unless it has first
filed a "notification" with the Election Commission, and
thus become "recognised" under PERA.' 7 While a recognised third party will not have to establish a separate
election fund from which to make such expenditures, it
will be prohibited from accepting money to fund spending
on an election from any donor who is not an identified,
"permissible source."" 8 Following the election, each recognised third party will also have to make a public return of
all the spending it has made, and of the source of all the
donations over £5,000 which it has received. 0 9
When it comes to involving themselves in an election campaign, all third parties (whether recognised or
not) will be subject to a £500 limit on spending designed
to "promote or procure the election" of some particular
individual constituency candidate." ° Additionally, recognised third parties will be required to abide by an overall
national spending limit set at five percent of the maximum limit allowed for any political party, divided
amongst the four parts of the U.K." This limit covers all
105. Political parties will henceforth only be able to accept donations
from "permissible donors." See PERA §§ 54, 56. The identity of any donor who
gives a political party more than £5,000 must be publicly disclosed. Id. §
62(4)(a), sched. 6. A national limit on election expenditures that can be incurred by political parties has also been introduced. Id. § 79, sched. 9 3(2)(3). The existing limits on spending by constituency candidates have been
retained. Id. § 132.
106. Id. § 85(2). See also infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
107. PERA §§ 88, 94(5).
108. PERA § 54(2), sched.11 6(1): For what counts as a "permissible source," see id. § 54(2) (essentially outlawing funding by non-residents).
109. Id. § 96, sched. 11 %19-11.
110. Id. § 131(3).
111. Id. § 94, sched. 10 3(2) (at the 2000 election this amounted to
some £793,500 in England, £108,000 in Scotland, £60,000 in Wales and
£27,000 in Northern Ireland).
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"controlled expenditures," defined widely to cover any
spending made on any "election material which is made
available to the public at large."'12 In turn, "election material" is given a broad definition that includes material
"which can reasonably be regarded as intended to" improve the prospects of electoral success of a particular political party, or any set of political parties or candidates
who support or oppose particular policies."3 Following the
lead taken in the Luft decision,"' spending money on
"prejudicing the electoral prospects" of any party is
deemed to be intended to improve the electoral prospects
of that party's opponents."5 The imposition of a one year
time limit on these expenditure controls is the most significant legislative departure from the recommendations
made by the Neill Committee.116 Consequently, third parties will be restricted in their spending only in the twelve
months preceding the election, with any expenditures
made outside of this period falling 1beyond
the reach of the
17
proposed new regulatory structure.

112. PERA § 85(2).
113. Id. § 85(3) (The definition is still met "even though [the election
material] can reasonably be regarded as intended to achieve any other purpose as well."). The explanatory notes accompanying the new legislation expand on the purpose of this definition:
In essence, the test is whether the material can reasonably be
regarded as intended to benefit a particular party's electoral
prospects. The cost of a poster campaign advocating a particular policy without explicitly supporting or attacking a named
political party might nevertheless fall to be regarded as 'controlled expenditure,' if the policy in question was closely identified with a particular political party or group of candidates.
Explanatory Notes to the Political Parties, Elections And Referendums Act
2000
1185,
at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/
2000en41.htm#end,cm4413 (last visited Nov. 18, 2001) [hereinafter
Explanatory Notes]. These limits are discussed more fully at infra
notes 134-143 and accompanying text.
114. See supra case discussion note 29.
115. PERA § 85(4)(b).
116. See THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO THE FIFTH
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE,

9T 7.9, 7.12, 7.26 [hereinafter THE GOVERNMENT'S

1999, Cm. 4413, at

PROPOSALS].

117. PERA sched. 10 T1 3(3). Although the definition of "election
expenditure" is made:
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V. PROBLEMS WITH THE LEGISLATION: WHAT ROLE FOR THE

COURTS?

Before these legislative measures have been subject
to advice notices from the newly-established Election
Commission,". as well as scrutiny by both the domestic
British courts and the ECHR, any discussion of how they
might operate to control third party spending will obviously be speculative. But even so, it is already possible to
identify some potential future issues arising from the
regulatory framework as ones that are likely to trouble
the courts. The point that the author wishes to emphasise
in moving to discuss these potential issues is that when
and if the courts should happen to adjudicate them, they
will also be taking on the role of determining what rules
governing third party spending are appropriate in the
context of the United Kingdom's democratic processes.
A. The Effect of the Human Rights Act 1998
With the passage of the HRA, the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention have been incorporated
into British domestic law. This incorporation has not occurred wholesale, rather under the HRA "certain defined
provisions of the Convention [have come to] enjoy a defined legal status."' In particular, these guaranteed
rights and freedoms do not enjoy quite the same "trumps"
status as is the case in the United States and (to a lesser

By reference to the date on which the benefits of the expenditure were received and not to the date the expenses were incurred. As a result, the cost, for example, of billboard advertisements displayed during an election period would count towards the expenditure limit irrespective of whether the advertisements were paid for before or after the start of that period.
THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS, supra note 116, at 7.11. See also PERA §
94(8).

118. See PERA §§ 1, 10. For an outline of the Election Commission's
role and functions, see the Electoral Commission Homepage at
http'/www.electoralcommission.gov.uk (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
119. K. D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and ParliamentaryDemocracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 84 (1999).
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extent) Canada. 2 ' The HRA explicitly states that Parliament retains final decision making authority over issues
of public policy, even to the extent of being able to pass
legislation that is in breach of the Convention. 2 ' That being said, however, the new law does somewhat expand the
role of the domestic courts in safeguarding the rights and
freedoms contained in the Convention against such legislative encroachment. Therefore, the amalgam created by
the HRA means that whilst Parliament retains its sovereignty in the technical, Diceyan sense,1 22 its decisionmaking authority will in the future be somewhat subverted by the inevitable transfer of power to the judiciary
that accompanies any sort of constitutionalization of
rights.' 3
In concrete terms, there are two ways in which the
provisions in the HRA enable the courts to use the rights
and freedoms contained in the Convention as a check
upon the actions of Parliament. 4 First of all, the HRA
requires that "so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation.. . must be read and given effect in a way which
is compatible with the Convention rights."' 5 Thus, if there
is any uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular legislative provision, the interpretation to be given must be
the one that is, in the court's eyes, the most favorable to
the protection of the rights and freedoms contained in the
Convention. If, however, the courts are unable to give
some legislative provision a reading that is compatible
with the Convention, then the courts' role is limited to
"mak[ing] a declaration of that incompatibility.' 26 The
120. For a defence of the idea of "rights as trumps," see RONALD
Rights as
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 164-65 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
121. See HRA § 6(3). But if the government introduces legislation
into Parliament which it knows to be in breach of the Convention, the government must "make a statement to [that] effect." Id. § 19(1)(b).
122. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 39-40 (10th ed. 1959).
123. Conor Gearty, Reflections on Human Rights and Civil Liberties
in Light of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998, 35 U. RICH. L. REV.
1, 11 (2001).
124. See Ewing, supra note 119, at 86-88.
125. HRA § 3(1).
126. Id. § 4(2).
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977); Ronald Dworkin,
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issuing of such a declaration does not affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of the offending legislation. 2 Nor does it place any formal requirement on
Parliament to act to remedy the offending legislative provision, although there is a "fast track" remedial procedure
available should the government wish to do so."' In practice, however, any government would come under a great
deal of political pressure to amend any legislation that
has been subject to such a declaration. 2 Therefore it may
be, from a realpolitik point of view, that any declaration of
incompatibility by the courts will, as a matter of course,
lead to the repeal or amendment of the offending legislative provision. ° In this sense the courts can be predicted
to take on something of a de facto, if not de jure, role as
the final arbiters of what the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention require in the U.K.'s domestic
context.
The HRA also gives the rights jurisprudence developed by the ECHR a defined status in the British domestic legal system. The Act does not go so far as to require
British courts to follow the ECHIR's decisions when determining what content ought to be given to the rights
and freedoms contained in the Convention. But it does
state that the domestic courts must take any decision of
the ECHR into account when making this kind of determination.' Given the substantial body of case law that
has now been developed by the ECHR, and the fact that
decisions of the British domestic courts can themselves be
reviewed by the ECHR, it seems likely that the domestic
courts will therefore accord that body's decisions a large

127. See Bamforth, supra note 15, at 573.
128. HRA § 10(2).
129. See K. D. Ewing, A Theory of DemocraticAdjudication: Towards
a Representative, Accountable and Independent Judiciary, 38 ALBERTA L.
REV. 708, 714 (2000).
130. See Ewing, supra note 119, at 99. See also Comments of the
United Kingdom's Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg in his Keynote Address to The University of Cambridge Centre for Public Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: PRACTICE AND PRNCIPLEs 4 (1998)

("If a declaration of incompatibility is made... Parliament may - not must,
but, in practice, we believe, usually will - legislate."
(emphasis in original)).
131. HRA § 2.
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measure of respect when it comes to deciding how to apply
the Convention in the national context of the U.K.
For the purposes of this Article, the importance of
the HRA is that it expressly gives courts the power to
consider the relationship between the limits on third
party spending contained in PERA and the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. The introduction
of this new power in turn gives the courts an expanded
role in making the final decision as to what manner and
degree of regulation of political spending is appropriate in
the electoral context. This is not to say, however, that the
courts' involvement in determining these issues will be an
entirely novel phenomena. As has been seen above, the
courts' previous interpretations of the legislative framework of regulation, as seen through the effects of the Luft
and Tronogh Mines cases, has meant that they have in
the past played a part in deciding how third party spending on electoral contests ought to be controlled."' So
rather than bringing the courts into a new area for the
first time, the introduction of the HRA will instead act to
extend the courts' influence by empowering them to
openly and explicitly consider whether the legislative limits on third party spending represent an appropriate balance between the twin goals of equality and liberty in the
British electoral process. Given this, it can be anticipated
that the domestic courts will become a forum, as was the
ECHR in the Bowman case, for aggrieved third parties
who feel that the new legislative spending limits unduly
hamper their ability to influence the electoral process,
and are therefore in breach of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Convention. In particular, two aspects
of the current legislation may be argued to be open to
such a challenge before the courts.
B. The Spending Limits and "IssueAdvocacy"
The test laid down in the new legislation for determining if some spending on a public message by a third
party constitutes a "controlled expenditure," - and is
thus subject to the statutory spending limits - looks to
132. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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the consequences or effect of that message. 3 ' Where the
message does not specifically identify some particular
party or candidate,13" but instead relates to an issue of
current political concern (what is known in the United
States as "issue advocacy")," 5 the decision as to whether
spending on that message constitutes a "controlled expenditure" depends on whether the effect of that message
"can reasonably be regarded as intended to" promote some
political party which has taken a policy stand in respect of
the issue to which that message relates. 3 ' It should be
noted that this test looks not at the consequences that the
third party spending the money actually intends to bring
about through the message that they are funding, but
rather at what consequences a reasonableperson viewing
the message would regard it as intended to bring about.
What is more, the effect of the message need not appear
to be exclusively intended to affect the outcome of an election in order for it to qualify as a "controlled expenditure."37 The definition extends to messages on issues even
if they "can reasonably be regarded as intended to achieve
any other purpose as well" as affecting an election."'
Therefore, all that seems to be required for some third
party spending on a message relating to an issue of public
policy to fall under the spending controls in PERA is that
the message have one of two very general consequences.
First of all, if the message appears to a reasonable'viewer
to be intended to "procure [the] electoral success of one or
more registered parties who advocate... [that] particular
poice[y]," then it will be a "controlled expenditure."'3 9 Alternatively, if the message appears to a reasonable viewer
to be intended to "otherwise enhance the standing of any
such party [which advocates the particular policy] . .
with the electorate in connection with any future relevant

133. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
134. See PERA § 85(4) ("[F]or the purposes of determining whether
any material is election material, it is immaterial that it does not expressly
mention the name of any party or candidate.").
135. For a discussion of the problems with regulating this type of
spending in the United States, see Geddis, supra note 13, at 39-47.
136. PERA § 85(3).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 85(3)(a)(ii).
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elections (whether imminent or otherwise)," then it will
likewise qualify as a "controlled expenditure. 140
The point of widening the limits on third party
spending to cover this type of "issue advocacy" is to try
and prevent third parties from evading the statutory expenditure limits through running advertisements that,
whilst nominally addressing issues of public policy, are in
reality aimed at affecting the election's outcome. 14' However, the problem with applying such a consequences or
effects test to these types of messages is that to extend
the legislation's reach too far into the discussion of public
issues may stifle genuine, robust debate about matters of
public importance.14 ' After all, political parties and public
issues are so inextricably intertwined that virtually every
issue which is of public importance, and which third parties might therefore wish to address, will also attract
some policy stance from some political party. This problem is further aggravated by the fact that the twelve
month period during which the expenditure limits apply
is retrospectively determined from the date on which the
election is held.4 3 Given that elections in the U.K. do not
necessarily occur at fixed intervals, and that a "snap election" may be called by the government at any point in a
five year electoral cycle, a third party will in many cases
have no way of knowing in advance whether or not its
spending on a particular issue will fall within the relevant
twelve month time period.
An example may serve to clarify these various difficulties in the legislation. Let us imagine that the issue of
foetal research becomes highly topical in the U.K., and a
public debate arises over the extent to which this practice
140. Id. § 85(3)(b).
141. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857,
862 (9th Cir. 1987) (attempting to broaden the range of third party speech
regulated by the Federal Election Campaign Act so as to "prevent speech that
is clearly intended to affect the outcome of a federal election from escaping,
either fortuitously or by design, the coverage of the Act."). See also Briffault,
supra note 14.
142. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform,
1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 317-20 (1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money
and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997).
143. See PERA § 94(8), sched. 10
3. See also THE GOVERNMENT'S
PROPOSALS, supra note 116.
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should be allowed. Desiring to take advantage of the interest in the issue, and flush with funds from a recent bequest, SPUC decides to spend £1.5 million on a six month
long publicity campaign seeking to mobilise public support for banning all abortion procedures. As a part of its
campaign, imagine SPUC includes the following line on
all its messages to the public: The unborn have no voice use yours to save them. Call the Prime Minister and tell
him to stop killing babies. 44
Four months into this advertising blitz, the Prime
Minister dissolves Parliament and announces that a general election will be held in six weeks time. One of the political parties contesting the election decides to make its
policy of opposition to abortion a central plank of its campaign. In the light of the looming election, what is the
status of SPUC's spending under PERAV Clearly, one
consequence of emphasising the issue of abortion, not to
mention inferring that the present Prime Minister is a
"baby killer," will be to call attention to the policy positions taken by the different political parties, and to encourage voters to support those parties who oppose the
practice.'46 If this consequence is enough to mean that the
spending can reasonably be regarded as intended to affect
the outcome of the election, then SPUC's spending on its
anti-abortion message will constitute a "controlled expenditure." SPUC would therefore have to halt its publicity
campaign in the run-up to the election so as to avoid
breaching the spending limits contained in PERA. 47 Yet it
is precisely at this electoral moment that SPUC would
most want its voice heard by the general public, as it is at
this point that its message will have the most chance of
being effective in terms of influencing public policy.'48
144. Compare this hypothetical with the example of a past third
party "issue" advertisement cited by the Neill Committee as being, in their
opinion, clearly intended to influence an election. The ad stated "It's not your
vote we ask for, it's your voice. Speak up against state-owned steel." NEILL
REPORT, supranote 42, at 132.
145. The explanatory notes to PERA do not help to clarify this question. See ExplanatoryNotes, supranote 113.
146. Note that "prejudicing the electoral prospects at the election of
other parties" is deemed to be included in the definition of "promot[ing] or
procur[ing] the electoral success" of any party. PERA § 85(4)(b).
147. See PERA § 94, sched. 10 3(2).
148. See Kirk L. Jowers, Issue Advocacy: If It Cannot Be Regulated
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So let us further imagine that a court is called upon
to apply PERA to the SPUC example,1 " either because
SPUC continues to spend on its advertising and is subsequently charged with an offence under PERA,"5° or because SPUC seeks a declaration that the spending limits
are an infringement of its right to free expression under
the Convention. The first question the court would have
to consider is whether SPUC's spending on this issue of
public importance can reasonably be regarded as intended
to have the effect of promoting or procuring the election of
some political party, especially given that the spending on
the message began some months before the election was
announced. When carrying out this interpretative task,
the HRA requires that the court read the legislation in a
way that is consistent with the rights contained in the
Convention, and also mandates that the findings of the
ECHR be considered when doing So.15 As such, the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in Article 10 of
the Convention 1 2 will be especially relevant, and the
ECHR's response to the legislative limits in Bowman is
instructive of how the British domestic courts might approach the interpretative task at hand. 15 3 In Bowman,
three of the ECHR judges expressed their opinion that the
leaflet at the centre of the case merely acted to provide
information to the voters in the local electorate, and as
When It Is Least Valuable, It Cannot Be Regulated When It Is Most Valuable,
50 CATH. U.L. REV. 65 (2000). See also Ridley & Doig, supra note 37 and accompanying text.
149. An outcome that, during the House of Lords' debate on the legislation, Viscount Astor predicted would occur:
The definition, 'reasonably be regarded as intended to achieve,'
is one that I feel is bound to end up in the courts. I do not understand how anyone can reasonably be expected to define that
under the Government's thinking. I believe that as soon as the
Bill becomes an Act, as night follows day we shall end up in the
courts for definition.
Lords Hansard, Oct.
18,
2000,
Column
1127,
available at
http://www.parliament.thestationaryoffice.co.uk/pa/id199900/idhansrd/vo001
018/text/0101.
150. PERA § 94(2)(a).
151. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
152. See Convention, supra note 48.
153. See Bowman v. United Kingdom, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (1998).
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such any expenditures made on it were not incurred with
"a view to promoting or procuring the election of any candidate".15 This conclusion seems a bit forced given the actual facts of the case, as it might be questioned what
other possible purpose Mrs. Bowman had for advertising
the local candidates' stances on abortion (in quite graphic
and emotive terms), if she did not then intend that information to have some influence on how the voters would
cast their votes. The key to the ECHR's finding would
therefore seem to lie in the lengths that it was prepared
to go to in rewriting the legislative framework so as to
preserve an arena for public discussion about issues such
as abortion.
In a similar way, the domestic courts in the U.K.
may endeavour to give a narrowed interpretation to the
limits on third party spending contained in PERA. So, for
instance, they may try to read the expenditure limits as
applying only to electoral messages that address policy
issues which are "clearly identified with" some particular
party, or that are published at a time when an election is
"clearly foreseeable." But whether such an interpretative
avenue is legitimately available to British judges is a
moot point. After all, the legislative provisions only require that a policy issue be "advocated" by a political
party for the spending limits to apply to third party messages that also address that issue.155 As such, there does
not seem to be any statutory language on which to hang a
narrower interpretation of the kinds of advertising messages that Parliament intended to be covered. What is
more, given its express decision to create a one-year period during which such spending is to be limited, and
given the fluid nature of the electoral timetable in the
U.K., Parliament must have meant the limits to apply to
spending that occurs before any election campaign could
be contemplated. Indeed, the legislation plainly states
that spending that enhances the electoral standing of
some party is subject to the statutory limits, "whether
[some future election] is imminent or otherwise." 6
As such, if the British courts were to use the Convention's guarantee of free expression (as incorporated
154. Id. at 193.
i55. PERA § 85(3)(a)(ii).
156. Id. § 85(4)(b).
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through the HRA) to limit the type of third party messages that the statutory limits apply to, they would be
making a naked policy choice about the appropriate shape
of the electoral discourse. Restricting the ambit of the
spending limits as they apply to advertising messages on
issues of public interest would reflect a conclusion that it
is more desirable to allow third parties a broad freedom to
address issues of policy than it is to constrain their involvement in the electoral process so as to ensure a measure of equality amongst electoral participants. In this
sense the line between rule interpretation and rule making by the courts under the HRA is a very fine one indeed.
What is more, the lingering uncertainty over how such a
consequences or effects test should be applied to third
party spending made on issues of current political significance may lead a court to conclude that there is no possible interpretation of the legislative provision available to
them that does not breach the Convention's guarantee of
freedom of expression. If this proved to be the case, then
the court would have to issue a "declaration of incompatibility" to that effect, thereby placing significant pressure
on the government to take legislative steps to remedy the
incompatibility.
There are two aspects of the legislative limits on
third party spending relating to issues of public policy
that may lead a court to conclude that they are incompatible with the right to freedom of expression contained
in the Convention. First of all, Article 10(2) of the Convention states that the guarantee of freedom of expression
can only be made "subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law."157 In

157. Convention, supra note 48, art. 10(2) (emphasis added). In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31 (1979), the ECHR laid
down the following test for whether an interference with the right to free
expression is "prescribed by law":
Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must
be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a
norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with
sufficient provision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to
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relation to PERA, the difficulty in knowing in advance
whether or not some spending on an issue will qualify as
a "controlled expenditure" may mean that the legislative
spending limits have not been so prescribed. Because the
test is so vaguely expressed, a third party can never be
sure at the time of making an expenditure on a particular
message whether or not it will fall within the spending
restrictions. Again, this "vagueness" problem is exacerbated by the fact that the limit on "controlled expenditures" retrospectively covers spending on all qualifying
messages up to a year before an election is actually held,
while under the British electoral system the government
is able to go to the polls at any time it wishes.'58 Thus, at
the time a third party undertakes such spending in relation to some particular issue, it will never be sure if, at
some future point, the spending will be deemed a "controlled expenditure" because an election is then called in
the following year. In an instructive parallel, problems
with the vagueness inherent in creating rules to differentiate between election speech, and general, issue oriented
speech, have lead courts in the United States 5 9 and in
Canada 6 ° to strike down spending limits on third party
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the
consequences which a given action may entail.
See also Huvig v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 52-57 (1990).
158. A point emphasised by Lord Willoughby de Broke during the
House of Lords' debate on the legislation:
The effect is to impose the most sweeping controls on third parties, including restrictions on spending and requirements relating to the disclosure and permissible source of donations, at all
times. Such an arbitrary restraint risks being struck down by
the courts, I should have thought, as a breach of the guarantee
of free speech under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. At the very least it will result in protracted legal disputes over whether or not specific materials were intended to influence the election.
Lords Hansard, Nov. 21, 2000, Column
782, available at
http'//www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uktpa/id199900/idhansrd/vo001
121/textI01121.
159. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1976).
160. See Harper v. Canada (A.G.), 2001 CarswellAtla 1063, [ 194,
208 (Decision of the Court of Queens Bench of Alberta holding that a provision in the Canada Elections Act, S.C., c. 9, §§ 319, 350 (2000) (Can.) (limiting
third party spending on messages "that take[ I a position on an issue with
which a registered party or candidate is associated") was too vague to be
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issue advocacy, as the uncertainty over what speech was
covered by these restrictions acted as an impermissible
"chill" on the expressive rights of those third parties.
The second way that the restrictions on third party
speech contained in PERA might breach the guarantee of
freedom of expression contained in the Convention is if it
could be successfully argued that the United Kingdom
government has failed to demonstrate that the spending
limits are "necessary in a democratic society."'' The
ECHR has developed a three-step evaluative process
when applying this "democratic necessity" test,'62 which
the HRA requires domestic courts to take into account
when considering the issue.'63 First of all, the court must
inquire whether the interest claimed by the government
as justifying the restriction is of a sort that may legitimately be used to limit freedom of expression. In the immediate case, the spending restrictions in PERA are intended to ensure a measure of equality between participants in the electoral process, which the ECHR found in
Bowman to be a legitimate issue of governmental concern.' Secondly, the court must ask if the consequences of
the measures taken are proportionate to the legitimate
interest that the government is seeking to protect. In applying this proportionality test, the courts will have to
specifically consider the balance between liberty and
equality in the electoral process. There is no doubt that
the spending limits have the potential to stop some third
parties from speaking out on political matters as much as
they might otherwise choose to. In addition, the variety of
expression that is potentially covered by the limits may
mean that some expression on matters of public concern
"prescribed by law," and was thus in breach of the Canadian Charter of
Rights And Freedoms).
161. See Convention, supra note 48, art. 10. See also supra notes 5556 and accompanying text.
162. See Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11, (1986);
Silver v. United Kingdom, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37, (1983); Handyside
v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1976).
163. HRA § 2.
164. Compare supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 ("[Tlhe concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.").
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will fall within the spending limits, even though those advertising messages are not intended by the speaker to be
related to any election.16 Both of these facts may mean
that the spending limits may result in a smaller volume of
discussion of public affairs than would otherwise be the
case. In recent years, British courts have come to show a
greater sensitivity toward the effects of such restrictions
on freedom of expression,166 and the ECHR has also held
that the maintenance of a free and robust environment for
political speech is a particularly important goal. 67
That being said, the spending limits do not have
the effect of completely silencing third parties, as they are
still able to spend close to £1 million around the U.K. on
making their views known. Thus, the limits on expenditure do not have quite the same effect on third party
speech as did, for example, the spending limits that were
held disproportionate in Bowman. What is more, the leg165. U.S. courts refer to the problem as the "overbreadth doctrine."
See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 651-52 (1984). See also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770-71 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
166. See R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Simms, 3 W.L.R. 328, 337 BC (1999). In the opinion of Lord Steyn:
The free flow of information and ideas informs political debate.
It is a safety valve: people are more ready to accept decisions
that go against them if they can in principle seek to influence
them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power by public officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and
administration of justice of the country.
Id. See also Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 4 All E.R. 609, 621 (1999). Per
Lord Nicholls:
At a pragmatic level, freedom to disseminate and receive information on political matters is essential to the proper functioning of the system of parliamentary democracy cherished in
this country. This freedom enables those who elect representatives to Parliament to make an informed choice, regarding individuals as well as policies, and those elected to make informed decisions.
Id.
167. See Ceylan v.. Turkey, 1999- IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 27; Castells v.
Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1992); Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1986); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6,
27 (1992) ("There is no warrant in [the ECHR's] case law for
distinguishing... between political discussion and discussion of other matters of public concern.").
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islative limits form a part of a comprehensive set of election regulations that were introduced in accordance with
the Neill Committee's recommendations, which in turn
followed this Committee's extensive examination of the
issue. 6 ' This fact may be relevant to the third step in the
"democratic necessity" test espoused by the ECHR,
namely the granting of a "margin of appreciation" to
Member States when deciding on what limits it is appropriate to place on freedom of expression. 89' The idea behind the granting of a margin of appreciation is that national decision-makers are usually better placed to resolve
policy issues for a particular country than is a court sitting in Strasbourg. In a similar way, British courts may
conclude that Parliament, acting in accordance with the
considered, non-partisan advice of the Neill Committee, is
in a better position to decide how an appropriate balance
should be struck between a third party's freedom to spend
on expressing its views on matters of public importance,
and an election process in which each participant is guaranteed a measure of equality.
As such, domestic courts ought to be cautious about
declaring that the imposition of spending limits on third
party issue advocacy cannot be shown to be "necessary in
a democratic society." The criticisms levelled by Gearty
against the ECHR's decision in Bowman would seem to be
particularly apposite here. 7 ° Because Parliament has
carefully considered the issues involved, and has chosen
to legislate in accordance with the advice of a nonpartisan and deliberative body of expert opinion, the
courts ought not to second guess the legislature's determination as to the appropriateness of imposing spending
limits on third party issue advocacy. However, the lack of
clarity as to which types of expenditures these limits apply to may be more problematic. The vagueness involved
in the test for deciding whether some category of speech is
subject to the expenditure limits may lead the courts to
declare that the limits on third party expressive rights
have not been "prescribed by law" in accordance with Ar168. See supra notes 89-117 and accompanying text. See also Ewing,
supra note 103.
169. See NEILL REPORT, supra note 42, at 130.
170. See Garrity, supra note 68, at 390-95 and accompanying text.
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If so, the courts would in

essence be saying to Parliament: "[Wihile you may choose
to limit third party spending on election issues if you
want to, you have to more carefully and precisely define
the sort of speech that is covered by these limits so that
the participants in the electoral process can know in adbe subject to the
vance whether their expression 7will
2
legislation."
the
in
limits
spending
C. Limits on the "Coordination"of Third Party Spending
There is a second feature of the new regulatory
structure that looks likely to exercise the courts, due to its
potential impact on individual expressive rights. Under
PERA, any expenditure incurred by a third party "in pursuance of a plan or other arrangement [with another third
party] ... which can reasonably be regarded as intended
to achieve a common purpose" of promoting some political
party's election prospects is deemed to be an expenditure
incurred by all of those involved in the plan.' For the
purposes of this rule the statutory definition of a "third
party" includes a political party." Therefore, if a third
party and a political party are found to have entered into
a "plan or other arrangement," under which the third
party will spend money on supporting the election prospects of that political party, then the political party must
also count that third party's spending towards the total
amount of expenditures it may make on the election. The
reason for having such a rule on collusive relationships is
to prevent third parties (and political parties) from coordinating their expenditures with other entities, thereby
preventing them from attempting to avoid the statutory
171. See supranotes 158-161 and accompanying text.
172. Compare Gearty, supra note 68, at 390-95, with Harper v. Canada (A.G.), 2001 CarswellAlta 1063, at 208, and Federal Election Comm'n
v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1064 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[The
[U.S.] Supreme Court has unambiguously held that the First Amendment
forbids the regulation of our political speech under such indeterminate standards.... To allow the government's power to be brought to bear on less,
would effectively be to dispossess ... citizens of their fundamental right to
engage in the very kind of political issue advocacy the First Amendment was
intended to protect- as this case well confirms.").
173. PERA § 94(6)(b).
174. Id. § 85(8).

146

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. X=VI: 1

spending limits by spreading their total expenditures
amongst a number of different entities.'75
However, a side-effect of restraining such relationships between third parties and political parties is that
any such restriction may have the incidental effect of
"heavily burden[ing] the common, probably necessary,
communications between candidates and constituencies
during
an election
campaign."76 In a liberalrepresentative democracy, free contact between the political parties and the various groups who represent the diverse concerns of voters is essential if political parties are
to be able to properly perform their role as coordinators
and advocates of public policy proposals. 77' What is more,
it is very hard to draw a bright line between an issue of
"policy" and a "campaign" issue, as has been seen in the
preceding discussion. A political party's decision on when
to take a stand, where to stand, and how to communicate
their stand on an issue of public policy will often form integral parts of its overall strategy to win public support.
Before making these important strategic decisions, a political party may well want to listen to the concerns of
sympathetic constituencies, and find out in turn what actions these groups are proposing to take in relation to the
issues. But if by engaging in such communications a political party runs the risk of being deemed to have entered
into a "plan or other arrangement" as per PERA, and thus
has to adopt the expenditures made by some third party
as a part of the limited funds it may spend on campaigning, then political parties may become cautious of having
any contact with third parties. The chill this would place
on the communications between political parties and third
parties is highly undesirable from the point of view of the
democratic process.
A refinement of the SPUC example considered ear175. Again, this is an issue the U.S. has struggled with in seeking to
distinguish between truly "independent" expenditures and those which are
"coordinated" with a candidate. See Geddis, supra note 13, at 43-52.
176. Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d
45, 90 (D.D.C. 1999).
177. For the claim that the integrative role of political parties makes
them "primus inter pares" amongst the institutions of civil society, see Nancy
L. Rosenblum, PoliticalParties as Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
813, 823-27 (2000).
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her may serve to illuminate the problem. Let us say that
prior to embarking upon its spending campaign, SPUC
approaches each of the political parties, informs all of
them of its spending plans, and urges them to also adopt
and promote a policy of outlawing abortion. One of the
political parties states that it agrees with this policy, expresses its support for SPUC's proposed advertising, and
makes it clear that it would seek to use the issue to solicit
votes in a future election campaign; provided there is
enough public interest to make it worthwhile politically.
SPUC then begins its advertising campaign, which succeeds in drawing the public's attention to the issue. As a
result, when the snap election is called, the political party
decides to capitalise on this public interest by making its
policy on abortion a more prominent part of its campaign.
The question that arises under PERA is whether
this sharing of information with regards to SPUC's spending plans constitutes the entering into a "plan or other
arrangement" to make expenditures on messages that appear to a reasonable observer to be intended to promote
the political party's election chances.'78 And there are arguments for taking the view that it does meet this test.
The net effect of the communication between SPUC and
the political party is that both become aware of the proposed strategy of the other, and both have established
that any spending on the abortion issue could be to their
mutual gain. SPUC discovered that there was an organised electoral vehicle that was prepared to compete for
public power on an anti-abortion platform, should SPUC
be able to create enough public interest to make it worth
the party's while to do so. In turn, the political party
found out that SPUC was intending to try and arouse
public interest in the abortion issue, that this spending
would represent a likely £1 million boost to its election
campaign. 9 Given that the communications between
them revealed this mutual benefit, perhaps the political
party at issue ought to be required to adopt SPUC's
spending as a part of its own (limited) election expenditures. After all, to allow SPUC's spending to stand independent of the political party's would be to, in effect, add
178. PERA § 94(6)(b).
179. This is the statutory limit on how much a third party may make
on "controlled expenditures." See supranote 111.
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£1 million to the total amount that can be spent on trying
to get the party elected to power. Political parties and
third parties could then make use of this loophole in the
regulatory system to evade the spending limits altogether,
through reaching tacit understandings regarding the
spending that the third party will undertake, and how
this will buttress the political party's election campaign.
That being said, it may be argued in response that
SPUC should be free to communicate with the political
parties on all matters of public policy with which it is concerned. In a democracy, the very purpose (and value) of an
organisation like SPUC lies in its role in lobbying for policy change. 8 ' And the political parties represent an important avenue for achieving such change, in that they are
organisations through which the diverse voices and interests of social actors can be transmitted into the decisionmaking processes of the state.18 ' At the risk of lapsing into
jargon, the political parties provide a means by which the
mechanisms of public opinion formation can act to disci18 2
pline and restrain the organs of public will formation.
However, should the political parties come to fear that a
consequence of engaging in communications with a third
party is that at election time they might have to adopt
that third party's spending as their own, then they will be
hesitant about entering into such dialogue. If the law
were to put such a potential blockage in the way of the
free flow of information between groups like SPUC and
political parties, then it risks isolating the political parties as institutions from the full blare of public opinion,
and hampering their ability to formulate policy that properly represents the preferences of voters.
Unfortunately, PERA provides no further guidance
180. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, The Self-Organisation of Society
and Democratic Rule: Specifying the Relationship, in PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRACY EAST AND WEST: COMPARISONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 9 (Deitrich
Rueschemeyer et al. eds., 1998).
181. See Samuel Issacharoff and Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus
Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 493

(2000).
182. See
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to help us resolve the issue. Therefore, in the final analysis it will be up to the courts to define the degree of collusion that is required to be shown between a political party
and a third party before their dealings will qualify as "a
plan or other arrangement."'83 In making this determination, British domestic courts will again have to read the
legislative provision through the lens of the HRA, and
thereby endeavour to give the test an interpretation that
is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in
the Convention. The courts will thus be required to take
particular notice of the right to freedom of expression contained in Article 10," as well as the right to freedom of
association contained in Article 11,185 and the effect that
any interpretation of the "plan or other arrangement" test
will have on these rights. As such, the decision as to how
this test should be applied will pose much the same challenges to the courts as has been described previously in
Part V.B.8 6 Given the potential imposition that the legislation places on the expressive and associative rights of
both political parties and third parties, can the court find
an interpretation for the legislative test that will enable it
to be precise enough to be "prescribed by law," and proso as to be "necessary
portionate enough in its application
8
society?"
in a democratic
Rather than engage in any further speculation on
how the courts may choose to approach this problem, the
author wishes simply to note that whatever approach the
courts take will also involve them in a decision as to what
represents an appropriate relationship between the par183. PERA § 94(6)(b).
184. See Convention, supra note 48, art. 10.
185. See id. art. 11. Article 11 of the Convention reads:
(1) Everyone has the right of peaceful assembly and to freedom
of association with others....
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
186. See supra notes 149-173 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 158, 162.
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ticipants in the U.K. electoral processes. If the courts
should interpret the "plan or other arrangement" test
broadly, so as to cover the kinds of information sharing in
the SPUC example, then the courts would in essence be
deciding that it is desirable for the activities of third parties and political parties to be kept separate so as to prevent them from gaining an unfair advantage by acting in
unison. Such an interpretation would represent a conclusion on the courts' part that preventing political actors
from forming "cartels," which could threaten the equality
amongst political participants that the spending limits
are designed to create, is more important than allowing
those political actors to freely exchange information about
their policy positions and proposed future courses of action.
However, should the courts give the test a narrower
interpretation, for example, if they should read it as requiring some explicit collusion between a political party
and a third party which is designed solely to evade the
legislative spending limits, then the courts would be deciding that it is more desirable for third parties and political parties to engage in a free and open dialogue about
their policy proposals and future actions than it is to close
off a potential loophole in the spending limits. This approach would reflect a view of the electoral system in
which the free flow of information between electoral participants is considered more important than the possibility that some set of participants will gain an advantage
over others by acting in unison to promote their interests
in the electoral process. Under such a view, the political
parties and those third parties that agree with their positions should be left free to discuss, refine and promote
those commonly shared policy issues. The point to be
noted here is simply that whichever interpretation the
courts take, it will represent a choice by the judiciary as
an institutional body as to the rules that are the most appropriate to shape and govern the United Kingdom's electoral processes.
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VI. CONCLUSION

In light of these ambiguities in the new regulatory
framework, as set up by PERA, the debate over the form
that the legal rules limiting third party expenditures on
the British election process ought to take will likely continue for some time yet. While the new legislation is
sourced in a general commitment on the part of Parliament to an egalitarian, "fairness" based vision of the election process (in keeping with the recommendations of the
Neill Report), it is still possible to identify some challenges arising from the claim that participants in the
electoral process should be free to use their monetary resources as they choose. On the one hand, the egalitarian
approach underpinning the legislation calls for the voting
process to be protected from the influence of unequal holdings of wealth, so as to maintain the conditions for equal
civic participation and self-rule. But any normative definition of democracy also contains a demand that there be
genuine and free debate about public issues in order to
allow individual voters to reach informed opinions about
the policy courses that the current government is pursuing, as well as assessing any alternative policy proposals.
It seems a dangerously Orwellian idea that the government ought to be permitted to regulate every aspect of
this process of public opinion formation solely because it
may have some consequent impact on the election process.
Here, the claims of political liberty, with their appeal to
the unconstrained "marketplace of ideas,"1 88 come into
their own.
Trying to reach an appropriate balance between
these two concerns will involve a series of contestable
choices as to how important. each of the particular values
is considered to be in the U.K.'s electoral process, as well
as the concrete regulatory means by which the two values
are to be traded off. Because these choices are so contestable, it may be predicted that the compromise reached
with the passage of PERA will in turn be the subject of
further public debate and challenge. In particular, the
new role that has been given to the courts by the HRA,
188.
221 (1992).
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that of guarding the rights and freedoms of Britons, 8 9
means that the domestic courts will take a greater part in
deciding these sorts of issues. They may do so covertly, by
giving the legislative provisions an interpretation that the
courts feel is required to make them consistent with the
rights and freedoms contained in the Convention. Or they
may do so overtly, by declaring that the provisions simply
cannot be reconciled with these rights and freedoms and
thereby placing political pressure upon the government to
alter the legislative framework. In either case, such decisions will reflect the courts' opinion over the correct way
that the electoral system should be viewed, and the appropriate rules that ought to be applied to it in order to
balance the competing values of equality and liberty.

189. See supra Part V.A.

